Political systems may respond not only to elections but also to expressions of dissatisfaction through complaints and geographic mobility. Understanding the implications of citizen dissatisfaction with local public services is the goal of this article, which examines empirically two forms of consequences of dissatisfaction-complaints to governmental agencies and decisions to move. The authors find that dissatisfied individuals are more likely to complain and to plan to move and that these two courses of action appear to be substitutes. An implication of the findings that stated dissatisfaction does have predictable behavioral consequences is that survey data on satisfaction with public services have information content that has been underappreciated in economics research.
T he relationships among satisfaction, complaints, and mobility in the market for local public services are poorly understood. In this article, we ask several questions. Do consumers who report being dissatisfied with police, street maintenance, parks, and trash collection choose to complain, to relocate, or both? In short, does stated dissatisfaction predict formal complaints or moving?
Answers to these questions are important from a number of perspectives. They help researchers understand the quantitative importance of processes, other than elections, for demonstrating approval or disapproval that are available to consumers of each of four types of local public services. This article also sheds light on the usefulness of survey methods as sources of information for predicting consumer behavior in the forms of complaints to government agencies and decisions to move out of the area. While evidence on revealed behavior has well-known advantages over survey information, the latter is often less costly to obtain, and so our findings that survey results have predictive value are noteworthy. For a public policy maker, the answers to the preceding questions highlight the usefulness of both survey methods and formal complaints as sources of information about consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction with public services, as well as about the effects of dissatisfaction on consumer complaints and geographic relocation.
Our quantitative findings that persons who report being dissatisfied with a local public service are more likely to complain and also to plan on moving are, at one level, unsurprising. However, we are not aware of any other studies that estimate the exit and voice responses to dissatisfaction with publicly provided services. While much has been written in the aftermath of Hirschman's (1970) work on exit, voice, and loyalty, as well as following Tiebout's (1956) model of "voting with one's feet" in search of an optimal combination of tax and public service levels, relatively little has been quantitative. 2 Some quantitative research has focused on public services overall or on schools-not on the specific local public services we study: streets, police, parks, and garbage-and the forces, including tax prices, affecting decisions to move but not on consumer choices between decisions to complain and to move (Percy and Hawkins 1992; John, Dowding, and Biggs 1995) . Lyons and Lowery (1989) empirically examine alternatives to exit, but while they consider use of voice in such forms as individuals attending meetings, contacting officials, and signing petitions, they do not disaggregate local public services.
Moreover, even the quantitative research on geographic mobility in response to the search for "better" combinations of public school quality and the associated tax prices has rarely addressed consumer choices between mobility and some form of formal complaint to the local governmental provider. 3 Still less frequently has prior research on local public services directed attention to the use of survey methods to elicit information that links reported satisfaction or dissatisfaction with formal complaints and with decisions to move.
There have been numerous studies of the effect of public school quality on real estate prices since Oates's (1969) classic work on the effects of taxation and local government spending on property values. For example, Epple and Sieg (1999) look comprehensively at attempts to estimate equilibrium models relating housing prices to school quality. However, these studies have not focused attention on other local governmental services, although Percy and Hawkins (1992) do break down the decision to exit by concern over schools, crime, or housing values. Even rarer has been the study of the choice between relocating to find a better mix of public service quality and tax levels, on one hand, and attempts to change the service mix in one's current location through a complaint process, on the other hand. In summary, there has been little empirical study of the interplay of dissatisfaction, mobility, and complaints in the context of government services other than schools. This article aims to fill this void. 4 The next section describes briefly the benefit-cost framework that we use to guide our analysis. The third section describes the survey data, the instrument from which they were obtained, and the variables used in our analysis. The fourth section considers the effects of dissatisfaction with local public services on decisions to complain to a government agency. The fifth section analyzes the effects of dissatisfaction on intentions to change residence. The sixth section concludes.
Complaints and Mobility and Their Connection with Dissatisfaction
Complaints are one way to signal dissatisfaction, but dissatisfied people may not complain. A dissatisfied person might not complain if she or he believed that a complaint would be ineffective and, hence, the expected benefits were low or if the costs of complaining were high.
Dissatisfaction is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a complaint. A complaint might be made even without dissatisfaction if a consumer-citizen acted opportunistically under conditions of informational asymmetry-that is, if there was a perceived opportunity to benefit by complaining. In either case-whether or not dissatisfaction is a necessary condition for a complaint-complaint behavior may be modeled usefully within a cost-benefit framework. We hypothesize that a complaint is made if and only if the expected net benefits are positive.
5 This has the implication that dissatisfaction is neither necessary nor sufficient for a complaint to be made.
In our framework, each resident observes the quality of local public services offered in the neighborhood and compares those levels with some exogenous standards of quality. Those standards may differ across individuals and are generally unobservable. The comparison of actual service quality with each individual's standard determines the degree to which the person is "satisfied" or "dissatisfied" with the services received. Whatever the result, the individual decides whether to complain about any particular public service, and a complaint is registered if the expected benefits exceed the costs. The benefits, if any, from complaining may take the form of improved service quality. Costs of complaining (including costs of "whistle-blowing") include the time required for the complaint process, its unpleasantness, and potential retaliation. Thus, because of the costs, there is some reservation service quality above which the individual will not complain. This is the quality at which the expected marginal benefit of complaining exactly equals the expected marginal cost. Because these costs and standards are individual specific, the reservation quality will differ across persons. Persons with high costs of complaining (e.g., for whom the marginal opportunity cost of time is high) will not complain even if very dissatisfied.
The cost of complaining could be negative-that is, complaining can be a consumption good-in which case the individual may complain even if there is no expected improvement in service quality. Within a benefit-cost framework, it is not the level of dissatisfaction per se that influences whether a person complains but the value of the expected increase in satisfaction, including the direct benefit, if any, from complaining per se and the marginal cost of a complaint. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that if a person complains, her or his initial level of satisfaction is negatively correlated with the change in satisfaction that is expected to result from the complaint. We also examine the importance of the "exit" alternative to either complaining or doing nothing (e.g., moving from the neighborhood, in the manner contemplated by Tiebout 1956) . We estimate the effect of an individual's level of stated satisfaction with public services on the likelihood of moving, recognizing that other variables such as job opportunities or family circumstances may be the dominant influences on mobility.
Since complaining, moving, and doing both or neither are all plausible responses to dissatisfaction with city services, the choice is likely to depend on how costly it is to express dissatisfaction in various ways, what the person wishes to achieve, and what the probabilities and costs are of achieving it by different means. 6 Responses to dissatisfaction thus depend on perceptions of what can be achieved by these various responses. To illustrate, one may be dissatisfied with garbage service in a large city-Chicago is the city analyzed below-but judges that since everyone receives the same level of service, a complaint is unlikely to bring an effective response because of the cost of improving service to all consumers, not merely to the complainer. However, if the quality of the service varies among small neighborhoods, the cost to government of improving service to that local community would be smaller, and so the probability of a favorable response to a complaint would be greater. Other things equal, the smaller the size of the production unit, the lower is the cost to government of responding to a complaint by improving service quality. In the limiting case in which a public service is individualized, there is little or no communication among individuals, and there are no economies of scale; the cost to the government of responding favorably to a complaint would be the cost of satisfying only the one complainer.
7 More generally, if the production technology were such that the same quality of service was provided to everyone in the geographic unit-say, a "neighborhood," which is the case for a local public good such as a (noncongested) park or a street-then the smaller the neighborhood production unit, the lower the cost to government of responding favorably to a complaint. At the same time, however, the smaller the neighborhood unit, the smaller would be the cost for a resident to move to another neighborhood within the city, thereby retaining much of the spatial advantages of the original place of residence, and so the more efficient would be the exit option.
In short, since a complaint may, but need not, have a favorable ex post effect, and since an individual who is dissatisfied has alternatives that include both relocating and purchasing private-good alternatives to governmentally provided services (Weisbrod 1975) , the person's optimal response to dissatisfaction depends on the nature of the dissatisfaction, the probability distribution of governmental responses, and the quality and prices of the perceived alternatives. All these variables are costly for an analyst to observe, and so determination of the likely responses to dissatisfaction cannot be determined from theory; empirical study is needed, which is the goal of this study. We ask the following: how are reported dissatisfaction with each of four forms of local public services, complaints about them to a government agency, and relocation in fact linked?
The Data
Our data come from a survey of Chicago residents' satisfaction with municipal garbage collection, street services, police services, and parks; complaints about each of them to a governmental agency; and relocation plans. The survey, carried out by the Northwestern University Survey Laboratory in late January and early February 1994, was a random telephone survey of 711 English-speaking adults who had been living in their current neighborhood for at least one year. Two groups were oversampled: Hispanics and residents of each of four demographically diverse neighborhoods in various parts of the city (Lincoln Park, Lower West Side, Portage Park, and Roseland). Lincoln Park, on the north side of Chicago, is a high-income, largely white neighborhood. The Lower West Side is a low-income community with a significant Hispanic component. Portage Park is a South Side middle-income, predominantly white neighborhood. Roseland is a predominantly lower middle-income African American neighborhood on the West Side. Because of sample size limitations, however, we aggregate the data and do not analyze neighborhood differences. The survey asked detailed questions about satisfaction with each of the four city services and collected data on personal characteristics and actions of respondents.
We report and analyze data for the 685 respondents who have nonmissing data for age, sex, education, home ownership status, number of complaints registered, and intentions to move. Descriptive statistics on the sample are in Table 1 . The key variables are those providing information on satisfaction, complaints, and intention to move. Satisfaction. For each of the four categories of government services, each respondent was asked whether he or she is "very satisfied," "somewhat satisfied," "somewhat dissatisfied," or "very dissatisfied." These terms were not defined in the survey, and we do not know the process by which respondents determined their responses. Responses could, but need not, reflect the difference between expected and realized service quality. For example, "high"-quality service, as determined objectively, would not imply high satisfaction if the expected level of service were even higher. Also, a person residing in a community with high levels of service quality and correspondingly high taxation could be less satisfied than a person with identical preferences and wealth who received lower quality service but paid a lower tax. Thus, the expected association between service quality and level of reported satisfaction is not clear, a priori.
Complaints. Our measure of complaints is the answer to the question about the previous year, which ended one to two months prior to the survey: "In 1993, how many times, if any, did you contact anyone to express a concern or complain about a city service in your neighborhood?" The survey also provides detailed information on the "most serious complaint made by each person who complained at least once." Respondents were asked which city service was the subject of the complaints and which agencies were contacted in pursuance of the complaints. 8 Thus, "complaints" were identified with contacts of government agencies, not with complaints made to friends or family.
Intention to move. The survey asked "How likely is it that you will move from your present neighborhood in the next two years?" Possible responses were "definitely move," "probably move," "uncertain/even chance," "probably not move," or "definitely not move." We do not know whether the person actually moved, either from Chicago or merely to another neighborhood.
Does Dissatisfaction Make a Complaint More Likely?
The greater the initial dissatisfaction, the greater would appear to be the likelihood of a person complaining. We expect, however, that not all dissatisfied persons will complain since complaining imposes costs. If those costs, however, are independent of the degree of dissatisfaction, we would expect complaints to be negatively related to level of satisfaction.
A deficiency of the data complicates the interpretation of the empirical work. The survey reports satisfaction with public services at the interview date rather than at the time the complaint was made, which could have been at any time in the preceding calendar year, as recently as one month earlier but as much as thirteen months earlier. Hence, we cannot be certain that the level of satisfaction recorded at the interview date is the level of satisfaction held at the time the complaint was made; the possibility exists that a dissatisfied person complained and the supply response had the effect of increasing the person's satisfaction. Table 2 relates reported satisfaction with each of the four services to whether the "most serious" complaint was about that service. An individual is listed as complaining about garbage services, for example, if she or he filed at least one complaint and also reports the most serious complaint as being about garbage. An individual is labeled as not complaining about garbage if she or he either does not complain at all or complains but the most serious complaint is not about garbage (so there is some possibility that a person labeled as not complaining about garbage actually did so as one of multiple 130 Public Finance Review Note: A small number of individuals did not answer the satisfaction questions, and so the number of observations in each panel sums to less than 685. In the table, the satisfaction levels refer to satisfaction with the particular service considered, and the number of complaints refers to the number of individuals who complain about that service. complaints). 9 A small number of individuals did not answer the satisfaction questions, so the observations in Table 2 sum to less than 685.
One clear observation from Table 2 is that dissatisfaction does not ensure a complaint. This is as expected from the benefit-cost model in light of the cost of complaining as well as the uncertain prospect of a favorable response. The vast majority of people do not complain about any of the four public services, even when they are dissatisfied. Twenty percent of "very dissatisfied" individuals complained about garbage, while the equivalent figures for the other services are 13 percent for police, 14 percent for streets, and 1 percent for parks. Even though most "very dissatisfied" people do not complain, they are still much more likely to complain than individuals reporting greater satisfaction, and there is a clear pattern that the proportion of complainers falls as dissatisfaction falls.
We noted earlier that complaints can occur even from persons who are satisfied, if the expected benefits are sufficient. Table 2 shows that while complaints are relatively uncommon among "satisfied" persons, they do occur. Among all four public services, some complainers report being either somewhat satisfied or very satisfied. The largest number of complaints is against street services, and of the total of fifty-eight such complaints, twenty-one were by people who described themselves as somewhat or very satisfied. However, the timing of variables is such that we cannot exclude the possibility that respondents who reported being satisfied were not satisfied at the time they complained but became satisfied later.
While Table 2 suggests that complaints to each of the four service providers are related to dissatisfaction with service quality, this correlation is not necessarily evidence of causation. Complaints may be affected by omitted variables (e.g., individual characteristics that influence both satisfaction and complaining behavior). Some people may be harder to satisfy and hence more likely to be dissatisfied and also more likely to complain. Thus, the evidence in Table 2 need not imply a causal link between satisfaction and complaint. The multivariate analysis below seeks to address this concern.
Multivariate Analysis
The empirical specification we use is as follows:
Here x i is a set of individual characteristics discussed below, satisfaction ij is a set of dummy indicators for the level of satisfaction of individual i with service j, satisfaction i, -j refers to variables capturing the satisfaction of i with services other than j, and e ij is an error term. We use a probit specification, reflecting the dichotomous dependent variable (e.g., whether the person did or did not complain about each particular service) to determine whether persons who report higher satisfaction with a service are less likely to complain about it. Recognizing the potential endogeneity of reported satisfaction, we use two approaches: assuming that the satisfaction as reported is an unbiased measure of satisfaction prior to the complaint and relaxing that assumption and using an instrumental variables approach. Because the sample size is limited, we are parsimonious with control variables. We include control dummies for race, education, sex, and home ownership, as well as the number of years the individual has resided in the neighborhood and the number of children in the household. Race variables are included to capture the likely fact that racial groups may have different benefits and costs of complaining that are incompletely captured by variables such as educational attainment. Education may capture the opportunity cost of time required to make a complaint and also the individual's ability to bring a complaint to a successful conclusion. The dichotomous "own home?" variable and the "years of residence in the present neighborhood" variable are included to capture the effects of attachment to the community, our assumption being that long-time home owners are less likely to move and more likely to do something (e.g., complain) about a public service deemed unsatisfactory. The respondent's sex and number of children are used as controls to determine whether either variable is associated with systematic variation in complaint behavior (Table 3) or the likelihood of moving (Table 7) . The sample sizes are too small to enable us to distinguish separately by race or by sex any true behavioral differences from sampling variation.
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Conditioning on observed individual characteristics may be inadequate if there are unobserved individual attributes that make people less likely to be satisfied and more likely to complain. Therefore, we include indicators for respondent satisfaction with each of the other three services; that is, in the garbage complaints probit, we include the respondent's satisfaction with the other services as well as with garbage services to deal with the possibility that some individuals are chronically dissatisfied. If satisfaction with garbage services is correlated with complaints about garbage but not with complaints about any of the other three services, it is likely that we are capturing a causal relationship between satisfaction and complaint.
Because we only know the service that was the target of the main complaint, some individuals whom we characterize as not having complained about, say, garbage may actually have complained about it. Similarly, some individuals whose main complaint is about garbage may also have complained about streets. Under this scenario, the coefficient on satisfaction with garbage will tend to be biased toward zero in the garbage probit, and the coefficient on dissatisfaction with streets will tend to be biased in a negative direction. 11 Thus, even with some measurement error, negative own-satisfaction effects and zero cross-satisfaction effects still strongly suggest a causal effect of satisfaction level on complaints. Table 3 contains the marginal effects from the probit models. For satisfaction with each of the services, the response of "very dissatisfied" is the omitted category.
12 Thus, the marginal effect of being, say, "somewhat dissatisfied" should be interpreted as the marginal effect of moving from being very dissatisfied to being somewhat dissatisfied, holding constant the other control variables. Considering garbage services (column (1)), we see that people who are satisfied with garbage are significantly less likely to complain than are very dissatisfied persons. Note also that none of the measures of satisfaction with the other three services is statistically significant in explaining complaints about garbage service, with one exception, individuals who are "somewhat satisfied" with streets are significantly less likely to complain about garbage services.
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For streets, column (2) findings are very similar: persons who are satisfied with streets are significantly less likely to complain about streets than are very dissatisfied individuals. None of the satisfaction measures for the other services is statistically significant in explaining complaints about streets.
Turning to complaints about police services in column (3), we find that no one who is very satisfied with police complains about police. Thus, in column (3), we have merged the cells of "somewhat satisfied" and "very satisfied" with police. We find again that dissatisfied individuals are more likely to complain.
14 There is no evidence that satisfaction or dissatisfaction with any of the other services affects the probability of complaining about police. Table 3 also includes the coefficients on individual characteristics. Some of these are statistically significant for explaining complaint probabilities on one public service or another, but no characteristic has a robust effect on complaining behavior across the services. Overall, it thus appears that increased consumer satisfaction is strongly associated with decreased probability of a complaint. Also, there is very little evidence of cross-service effects and, in that sense, of individuals' systematic tendency to be dissatisfied and to complain. Finally, individual consumer characteristics play a weak role, with no characteristic exhibiting a significant explanatory effect on complaints about more than one type of service. For example, homeowners are more likely than renters to complain about streets but not about other municipal services, and residents with more education are more likely to complain about police but not about other services.
Bias Due to Mistiming of Satisfaction Variables
In the probit analysis, we used measured satisfaction (at the time of the survey) as a proxy for satisfaction at the time of complaint. If the response to a complaint increased subsequent citizen satisfaction, this mismeasurement of satisfaction at the time of complaint would bias against our finding a negative relationship between satisfaction and complaint. Thus, satisfaction may be endogenous in our complaints specifications if the act of complaining has an impact, during subsequent months, on reported satisfaction with services. In this section, we attempt an instrumental variables (IV) approach to this problem.
A suitable instrument for satisfaction is one that is correlated with satisfaction in the past year but is not related to the costs or benefits of complaining. Natural choices are variables that measure the individual's perception of the quality and quantity of service received over the preceding year. Our data include answers to the following questions about each public service: (1) for garbage, "How often was your garbage collected in 1993?" which takes three values-less than once a week, once a week, and more than once a week; (2) for streets, "How many days did you see repairs on the streets in 1993?"; and for police, "How many times did you contact the police in 1993?" The perceived frequency of garbage collection is likely to be positively related to satisfaction with garbage services. The number of days street repairs were noticed could have a positive or negative impact as repairs lead to both disruption and improvements. Contacting the police many times could either imply a large crime problem that would be associated with dissatisfaction with the police or trust in the police, which suggests satisfaction. 15 We use these as instruments, on the assumption that they are unrelated to the costs and benefits of complaining.
Because instrumental variable analysis is difficult in nonlinear models, we simplify the specification so we can use a bivariate probit model. Thus, we collapse the dissatisfaction variables into binary indicators that take the value of 1 if satisfied (somewhat or very) and 0 otherwise. The empirical specification is
Here x i is the set of individual characteristics, z ij denotes the instruments for whether the individual is satisfied with service j, satisfaction ij is a binary indi-cator for whether individual i is satisfied with service j, and e ij and u ij are error terms. The results are in Table 4 . The first row of Table 4 reports probit marginal effects to demonstrate that the earlier finding that dissatisfaction is associated with complaining is still found here. In the second row of Table 4 , we report the bivariate probit marginal effects from equation (2) for each service.
For streets, the marginal effect of satisfaction on complaints from the bivariate probit is negative but not significantly different either from zero or from the univariate probit marginal effect. The police and garbage marginal effects are also negative but are statistically significant and bigger (in absolute terms) than the univariate probit marginal effects. Taken together, these three estimates are consistent with our prior that the earlier probit estimates are biased toward zero because satisfaction is measured after the complaints have taken place. However, given the small sample size and imprecise coefficient estimates, these estimates should be treated with some caution.
In Table 5 , we report first-stage regressions for satisfaction (marginal effects from equation (3)) to show that, for each public service, the instruments have explanatory power. We see that the perceived frequency of garbage collection is related to satisfaction with garbage in that moving from reporting service less than once a week to once a week or more increases the probability of being satisfied with garbage services by almost 0.2. Likewise, observing street repairs more frequently leads to higher satisfaction with streets. Finally, individuals who called the police most frequently are the 136 Public Finance Review least satisfied with police. For all three services, the instruments are quite strong, suggesting that weak-instrument biases are unlikely.
Determinants of the Total Number of Complaints
Having determined that satisfaction with a particular service makes individuals less likely to complain about that service, we now study which types of dissatisfaction seem most important in determining the number of complaints. We estimate the following specification: (4) Here the subscript g is for garbage, s is for streets, po is for police, and pa is for parks.
The distribution of the number of complaints over the sample is quite awkward for empirical analysis. 16 Most people make zero complaints, onethird of individuals make between one and six complaints during the year, and there is a small group of 1 to 2 percent of all individuals who make many (more than six) complaints. The large number of zeroes and the lack of continuity make ordinary least squares (OLS) unattractive; Tobit is also unattractive since very few individuals make more than six complaints, and the distri- Note: Also included in each model are controls for race, education, home ownership, years in the current neighborhood, sex, and number of children in the household. Omitted categories are, respectively, garbage collected less than once a week, zero days of street repairs, and zero calls to police. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5 percent level. **Significant at 1 percent level.
bution exhibits strong anchoring above twenty complaints. We use an ordered probit model to analyze the data. To do so, we group observations into five complaint frequency categories: zero, one, two or three, four to six, and seven or more. This approach allows us to use most of the true variability in the data while not assuming they are drawn from a continuous distribution. The marginal effects from the ordered probit model are in Table 6 . The coefficients in column (1) of Table 6 can be interpreted as the marginal effects of the variables on the probability that there are zero complaints. As with Table 3 , the "very dissatisfied" response is the omitted category. It is clear that being satisfied, somewhat or very, with a service increases the probability of not making any complaints. As one moves across the table, each column is associated with an increasing number of complaints. We expect that people who are somewhat or very satisfied are less likely to complain, in which case the coefficients would decrease as one moved across the columns. The coefficients do tend to decrease; that is, the effect of moving from being "very dissatisfied" to a higher level of satisfaction tends to have a bigger negative impact on the probability of making a lot of complaints (compared to the probability of making no complaints or a small number of complaints). However, the pattern is not uniform, and the differences are generally not statistically significant. This, together with our earlier findings, suggests that while the level of satisfaction with services is a very strong predictor of whether an individual complains, it is a weaker predictor of the number of complaints made, conditional on complaining at least once.
Satisfaction is not the only variable affecting complaint behavior. Some individual characteristics are also significantly related to the number of complaints made. Among the racial groups, blacks are particularly likely to complain. More educated individuals also make significantly more complaints, possibly because they are more effective in making complaints. As expected, homeowners and individuals who have resided in the neighborhood for a long time make more complaints than others, which presumably reflects the fact that their greater likelihood of remaining in the area increases the expected benefit of making a complaint.
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Mobility as a Response to Dissatisfaction
Moving is another mechanism for dealing with public services that one regards as unsatisfactory. 18 In this section, we test the hypothesis that reported satisfaction with public services affects planned exit from the community. As described earlier, respondents report their likelihood of moving in broad categories: "definitely move," "probably move," "uncertain/even Table 6 Marginal chance," "probably not move," or "definitely not move." To determine whether people respond to their dissatisfaction with city services by planning to exit, we estimate an ordered probit equation for the likelihood that the person reports planning to move in the next two years. 19 One should keep in mind that individuals who are particularly dissatisfied with public services in the area may have already left, and so the sample is composed of people who were not so dissatisfied with public services that they have left the area by the time of the survey. 20 The independent variables are satisfaction indicators for each of the four services and the same demographic controls used in the complaints analysis. The sample selection bias associated with dissatisfied people who have already moved likely has the effect of biasing toward zero our estimates of the effects of satisfaction on exit behavior. We estimate the following model by ordered probit:
. (5) The ordered probit estimates on the stated mobility response to satisfaction are in Table 7 . Once again, we report the marginal effects of the various satisfaction and demographic control variables for each level of the dependent variable. As one moves across the columns from left to right, the outcomes indicate the estimated marginal probabilities of each of the five responses indicating the likelihood of moving. Our results suggest that satisfaction with police and parks are the important determinants of intention to move, rather than satisfaction with garbage or streets. Individuals who are somewhat or very satisfied with police or are very satisfied with parks are significantly more likely to report intending not to move and significantly less likely to report an intention to move. Overall, it appears that satisfaction with these local government services is an important factor influencing attitudes toward moving from the neighborhood.
Jointly Modeling Complaints and Mobility
It is interesting to examine whether complaints and mobility are substitutes or complements. They are gross substitutes if a rise in the cost of moving leads to an increase in complaining and vice versa. Our approach is to use home ownership as a status that implies a high cost of geographical mobility and consider the estimates when it is used as an instrument for mobility. Table 7 Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit: We report results in Table 8 . In the first column, we examine how home ownership affects the likelihood of moving. We find that, conditional on the other controls (including level of satisfaction), home ownership reduces the probability of planned mobility by about 17 percent. The effect is very strongly statistically significant, suggesting that this variable exerts a powerful effect on the cost of mobility.
In the first panel of the second column, we report probit estimates of the effect of being likely to move on the probability of making at least one complaint. 22 This strategy ignores the endogeneity issues and simply adds the probability of moving as an explanatory variable in the complaints equation. We now find that a greater probability of moving has a small negative effect on whether an individual complains. While we find a negative relationship between complaints and planned mobility, the interpretation of the marginal effect in this case is difficult as the effects of planned mobility may be biased in an uncertain direction.
Therefore, in the second panel of column (2), we estimate a bivariate probit model in which home ownership is used as an instrument for planned mobility. We find that the marginal effects of planned mobility from the bivariate probit are much more negative than those from the probit in the top panel. This suggests that complaints and mobility are substitutes and that the earlier probit estimates are biased because of the presence of some unmeasured factor that influences both complaints and mobility. In Hirschman's (1970) 
Conclusions and Future Research
We have found that survey data on reported satisfaction or dissatisfaction with local public services-police, parks, garbage, and streets-is useful information for predicting two types of behavior. We find that complaints ("voice") about local public services are predictable responses to stated dissatisfaction with service quality. The findings are consistent with a benefitcost framework in which complaints increase with dissatisfaction, insofar as the expected benefit from complaining increases with the level of dissatisfaction. We also find evidence that geographic mobility ("exit") is a response to dissatisfaction with public services. The reported probability of planning to move within the next two years is positively and significantly associated with low satisfaction with police services and park services, conditional on a number of control variables. Given the many forces affecting population mobility, it was not self-evident that dissatisfaction with these public services would be powerful enough to exert observable significant effects on mobility. It appears, however, that people may well be responding to choices of public services in the direction posited by Tiebout (1956) . Our results also indicate that complaints and planned mobility-Hirschman's (1970) "voice" and "exit"-are substitutes, not complements.
The findings that information on residents' dissatisfaction with local public services has value for predicting both complaints and mobility have other implications. Many forms of data on dissatisfaction with various governmental, private nonprofit, and private enterprise sector activities are gathered through consumer surveys, and these appear to have useful information content with respect to predicting consumer behavior. There are benefits from greater utilization of satisfaction data in economic analysis.
Notes
1. We do not focus on the determinants of dissatisfaction, directing attention instead to its effects. Analyses of the meaning and causes of "satisfaction" and "dissatisfaction" have been examined elsewhere (Yi 1990) .
2. There has been quantitative work on these issues in areas other than public services. For example, Day (1984) studied responses to dissatisfaction with private goods, and Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) studied dissatisfaction in and complaints to government about nursing homes. Furthermore, in labor markets, the interplay of dissatisfaction, voice, quits, and loyalty to employers has been studied by Cahuc and Kramarz (1997 ), Farrell (1983 ), and Freeman (1980 . Data from worker satisfaction surveys have been used to test a model of employee voice and intent to exit in unionized firms (Withey and Cooper 1989; Boroff and Lewin 1997 17. More of the individual characteristics are statistically significant in this analysis than in the earlier analysis of complaints about individual services. While we are not certain as to why this is, we suspect that it is related to the greater variation in the dependent variable when we are modeling the number of complaints rather than just a binary indicator for whether any complaint occurred.
18. Reasons given by respondents for likely relocation have been studied by Lyons and Lowery (1989) .
19. There are, of course, many reasons for mobility other than dissatisfaction with public services. Thus, a negative relationship between satisfaction and intention to move could reflect such omitted variables if persons who are satisfied are also less likely to move for some other reason.
20. We have examined this issue by running the estimation separately for individuals who have been in the neighborhood for ten years or more and persons who are in the neighborhood less than ten years (ten years is the median value in our sample). We found no significant differences between the two groups.
21. We have no plausible instrument for complaining. In principle, being retired or otherwise nonemployed may reduce the time cost of complaining. However, we find that these have statistically insignificant effects on complaining behavior in our sample. The home ownership instrument is not a perfect instrument for mobility as homeowners may be different from renters in many respects, including the cost of complaining.
22. We include the same explanatory variables as earlier, with the exception that we now omit home ownership because it is used as an instrument. For brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the other explanatory variables as these are similar to the earlier specifications.
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